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MULTIJURISDICTIONAL ESTATES AND ARTICLE II
OF THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum*
INTRODUCTION
The prefatory note' to the 1990 revisions of article II of the Uni-
form Probate Code ("UPC")2 indicates that the changes wrought are
a response'to several developments since the promulgation of the
UPC in 1969. The prefatory note emphasizes the decline of formal-
ism, the proliferation of will substitutes, the multiple-marriage soci-
ety, and the rise of the partnership/marital sharing theory as stimula-
tive of the revisions introduced.3 The theme of this article is that one
other crucial development has been essentially ignored. No serious
attempt has yet been made by the drafters to address the immensely
complex yet commonplace issues associated with, and being gener-
ated by, the unprecedented geographic mobility of individuals and
their ability, in a world of rapid communications and decreasing con-
straints on investment, to own property in more than one jurisdic-
tion. While the UPC is a masterful work of law reform, the issues
raised by the increasingly peripatetic nature of individuals and their
capital requires the most careful attention. If the UPC is to be fully
relevant in the future in facilitating the proper disposition of and de-
termination of rights in property, it must take a more active role in
the burgeoning effort to provide a viable legal framework for multiju-
risdictional wealth transfer.4
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
See UNIF. PROB. CODE ("U.P.C") art. II, prefatory note (1991).
Article II of the UPC, prior to its revision, can be found at 8 U.L.A. 53 (1983).
U.P.C. art. II, prefatory note (1991).
For other works in this area, see, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING: PRINCIPLES AND
STRATEGIES (Donald D. Kozusko & Jeffrey A. Schoenblum eds., 1991); ROBERT C. LAWRENCE III,
INTERNATIONAL TAX AND ESTATE PLANNING (2d ed. 1989); WILLIAM H. NEWTON, III, INTERNA-
TIONAL ESTATE PLANNING (1981 & Supp. 1992); JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MUL-
TINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING (1982 & Supp. 1992).
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I. THE LOCAL ORIENTATION OF AMERICAN ESTATE LAWYERS, THE
ECONOMICS OF ESTATE PRACTICE, AND THE ETHOS OF THE UPC
The reforms introduced by the 1990 revisions to article II are of
great significance. Nevertheless, the preoccupation with such issues
as payable-on-death accounts," antilapse,' and ademption,7 when
contrasted with the virtual absence of concern with multijurisdic-
tional issues, requires an explanation. In this author's view, at least
part of the explanation lies in the fundamental parochialism of
American estate practice. Unlike certain other areas of legal practice,
wealth transfer in the United States is an area of law and policy al-
most wholly the domain of the states.' Within the states, "probate
practice" is centered typically in local probate courts.9 Those engaged
in "probate practice" are typically single or small firm practitioners,
and this work represents one of the routine, reliable foundations of
their general practices."°
There is a vital practice-economics dimension as well. Few attor-
neys are members of more than one or two state bars. Resolving mul-
tijurisdictional issues may require consulting with out-of-state coun-
sel regarding the law of a foreign jurisdiction. Estate practice will not
necessarily permit shifting these costs to the consumer." Moreover,
there is a substantial opportunity cost incurred, to the extent that
the form-oriented, efficient, assembly-line production of wills and
other dispositive instruments is impeded by more intricate and sui
generis issues.
A further relevant factor is the intellectual focus of estates lawyers.
Their concern is with statutory and case law directly addressing
wealth transfer and its taxation. The multijurisdictional dimension
fundamentally concerns jurisdiction and choice of law, matters left to
conflicts scholars and proceduralists. Conflicts scholars and
proceduralists are more concerned with a coherent theory for choice
of law or jurisdiction that cuts across several fields of law, and are
not especially sensitive to the particular history, traditions, and stan-
U.P.C. § 2-706 (1991).
8 Id. § 2-603.
7Id. § 2-606.
" See generally U.P.C. art. II, pt. 10 prefatory note (1991)..
See, e.g., U.P.C. § 3-201(a) (1991).
10 See, e.g., The Role of the Probate Lawyer in a Changing Environment, 22 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TR. J. 753, 760 (1987) (Report of the Probate & Trust Division Task Force on the
Changing Role of Probate Lawyers).
" See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A
Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1092, 1101, 1104 (1983).
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dards associated with estate practice.-They also tend to minimize val-
ues such as predictability and fulfillment of the expectations of the
wealth transferor. 2 Principles such as the effectuation of testamen-
tary intent do not command the same respect as does the methodol-
ogy of selecting the proper governing law.
The nature of the uniform laws process by which estate law is re-
formed further entrenches the geographic and intellectual parochial-
ism of American estate lawyers. Rather than ,a "national probate
code," a model law is presented that can then be enacted by the vari-
ous states.'" On the one hand, this approach reinforces the tendency
to regard wealth transfer law as the exclusive domain of the individ-
ual states. On the' other hand, the masterful quality of the UPC sup-
ports the argument for its adoption throughout the country. As with
other "uniform" laws, the underlying assumption is that over time
the adoption by all the states will lead to a modern, uniform law
throughout the country. Too great attention to. multijurisdictional
concerns would belie this assumption, and reveal a lack of confidence
in the universal adoption or inherent quality of the UPC. After all, if
all states adopt the UPC and apply it in essentially the same manner
there will be little need, at least in the case of wholly American es-
tates, to be concerned with multijurisdictional issues. Thus, underly-
ing any serious effort to address, for example, questions of choice of
law, is the unpalatable admission that the UPC ,is not a "uniform"
law twenty-three years after its adoption and is not likely to be so in
the foreseeable future."'
II. WILL FORMALITIES
One area in which multijurisdictional issues commonly arise is will
formalities. A will may be executed consistent with the law of one
12 See generally Jeffrey Schoenblum, Choice of Law and Succession to Wealth: A Critical
Analysis of the Hague Convention on Succession to Decedents' Estates, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 83,
101 (1991).
" The debate over a model law or direct enactment approach has also raged in the-interna-
tional arena. See, e.g., Ren6 David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2 INT'L
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMP. L. (The Legal Systems of the World: Their Comparison and Unifica-
tion) ch. 5, at 3 (Ren6 David ed., 1971); KURT H. NADELMANN, Uniform Legislation Versus
International Conventions as a Method of Unification of Private International Law, in CON-
FLICT OF LAWS: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE 87 (1972); KURT H. NADELMANN, Uniform Legis-
lation Versus International Conventions Revisited, in CONFLICT OF LAWS: INTERNATIONAL AND
INTERSTATE 141 (1972).
" Fifteen states have enacted the UPC. However, in some states only parts of the UPC have
been enacted. See 8 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1992) (listing the states that have adopted the UPC at
least in part).
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jurisdiction, but offered for probate in another. The UPC addresses
the matter, but not in a theoretically consistent fashion. UPC section
2-502 requires a will to be in writing,1 signed by the testator or in
the testator's name at his direction,' and by two witnesses." The
section also recognizes holographic wills, if signed by the testator and
if the material portions of the document are in the testator's
handwriting. 8
UPC section 2-503 provides that under certain circumstances, a
document or addition to a document that does not comply fully with
section 2-502 will, nevertheless, be recognized as a valid will. This is
the case when "the proponent . . . establishes by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to
constitute . . . the decedent's will."'" This provision adopts the com-
pelling argument made by Professor John Langbein that harmless er-
ror should not impede the effectuation of a testator's testamentary
intent.20 However, as is noted in the comment following section 2-
503, "[tlhe larger the departure from Section 2-502 formality, the
harder it will be to satisfy the court that the instrument reflects the
testator's intent."2'
The very sensitive and sensible balance struck by sections 2-502
and 2-503 is not reflected in the UPC's approach when a document
from another jurisdiction is before a UPC-state court. Pursuant to
section 2-506, a written will is valid, though not executed in compli-
ance with sections 2-502 or 2-503,
if its execution complies with the law at the time of execution
of the place where the will is executed, or of the law of the
place where at the time of execution or at the time of death
the testator is domiciled, has a place of abode, or is a
national. 22
This provision is consistent with the trend in many states to recog-
nize a will as formally valid so long as it is valid under the laws of
some jurisdiction with which the testator had a specified connection
at the time of execution or death. However, many states do not go as
U.P.C. § 2-502(a)(1) (1991).
10 Id. § 2-502(a)(2).
1 Id. § 2-502(a)(3).
" Id. § 2-502(b).
o Id. § 2-503.
10 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Re-
port on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1987); John H.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1975).
" See U.P.C. § 2-503 cmt. (1991).
2 Id. § 2-506.
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far as the UPC. 3 To the extent that they do, such provisions suffer
from an absence of critical analysis of the choice of law problem and
its relation to the state's own minimal requirements for validation of
a dispositive document. Indeed, in contrast to many other aspects of
the UPC, section 2-506 does not withstand critical analysis and
should be revised.
The most striking flaw in section 2-506 is that it conflicts directly
with sections 2-502 and 2-503. Those sections are designed to do
away with rules that permit minor technical deviations or other
harmless error to invalidate a will that would effectuate testamentary
intent. Still, pursuant to section 2-503, proponents are required to
proffer "clear and convincing evidence" of that intent.2 4 As an exam-
ple of the foregoing, consider a domiciliary of a UPC state who has
not executed a will in conformity with section 2-502, and no clear
23 The following is a listing of these states. A will is formally valid if valid under the law of a
state indicated in the parentheses following the complete statutory citation: ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 28-25-105 (Michie 1987) (Arkansas, domicile at death or at time of execution); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45a-251 (West Supp. 1992) (Connecticut, place of execution); District of Columbia
(no provision); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.502(2) (West 1976 & Supp. 1992) (in the case of a nonresi-
dent, place "where the testator was at the time of execution"); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-3-42 and
53-3-43 (1982) (Georgia for Georgia-situs real property, domicile at death for Georgia-situs per-
sonal property); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 7-1 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (Illinois, place of exe-
cution, place of domicile at time of execution); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.283 (West 1992) (Iowa,
place of execution, domicile of testator); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.120 (Baldwin 1984 & Supp.
1990) (domicile at death); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2401 (West 1991) (Louisiana, place of execu-
tion, domicile at time of execution); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 4-104 (1991) (Maryland,
place where executed, testator's domicile); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 5 (West 1981)
(Massachusetts, place where executed, testator's domicile); Mississippi (no provision); NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.080 (Michie 1986) (Nevada, place of execution, testator's domicile); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:5 (1974) (New Hampshire, place of execution); North Carolina (no provi-
sion); Ohio (no provision); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 71 (West 1991) (Oklahoma, place of exe-
cution, domicile at time of execution); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504.1 (1974) (Pennsylvania,
domicile at execution or death); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-505 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1991)
(South Carolina, place of execution, testator's domicile); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-2-10
(1984) (South Dakota, place of execution, testator's domicile); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-107
(1984) (Tennessee, place of execution, domicile at time of execution); Texas (no provision); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 112 (1989) (Vermont, place of execution, domicile); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-53 (Michie 1991) (no provision for real property, domicile at death with regard to per-
sonal property); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-5 (1982) (no provision for real property, domicile at death
with regard to personal property); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 853.05 (West 1991) (Wisconsin, place of
execution, domicile at time of execution). The foregoing survey includes Florida and South
Carolina, two states that have enacted the UPC in part. States that have no provision are likely
to follow the common law rule and apply the law of the situs with regard to real property and
the law of the domicile at death with regard, to personal property. See 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra
note 4, §§ 14.02-14.03. States not listed above have enacted the UPC.
24 U.P.C. § 2-503 (1991). Under § 2-506, however, a document could be probated, even
though it did not conform to the UPC formalities of execution and even though there was not
clear and convincing evidence that it reflected the testator's intent.
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,and convincing evidence exists that the domiciliary intended the in-
strument to be her will. If the instrument was executed consistently
with the formalities of the non-UPC state in which it was executed,
section 2-506 would require its probate. However, another domiciliary
of the same UPC state, who had signed the document in-state, would
not be entitled to have his will probated.
There is no apparent reason why the state in which a person signs
an instrument should determine whether it is reliable enough to be
probated. Likewise, if a domiciliary of a UPC state has an "abode '26
in a non-UPC jurisdiction that does not compel observance of even
minimal UPC formalities, that individual's writing will be probatable
if valid in the jurisdiction in which the abode is situated. The same is
not true for a domiciliary who may not have or even be able to afford
a place of abode in the other jurisdiction. 26 Section 2-506 actually
goes further. Even if two persons have their sole abodes in a UPC
state and execute their wills there, one who is a national of a country
that does not insist on UPC standards would die with a probatable
will, if it met the lower standards of that country. That- would not be
the case for a national of the United States.2 7
The connection that a person has or had with a particular jurisdic-
tion does not respond to the concern whether sufficient formalities
have been observed or whether there is clear and convincing evi-
dence, despite nonobservance of formalities, that the writing mirrors
the testator's intent. Section 2-506's reliance upon connections with
particular jurisdictions, rather than the policies manifest in sections
2-502 and 2-503, seems grounded in protection of expectations. The
comment following section 2-506 states that the "purpose of this sec-
tion is to provide a wide opportunity for validation of expectations of
testators. 2 8 In other words, a testator who executes a will in con-
formity with the laws of his domiciliary state X, but happens to die
2' This term is not defined in the UPC. Although it has been used in tax treaties, there is
little law as to the meaning of the term in the context of succession or even choice of law. The
term is sometimes used in connection with the term "habitual residence." The comparativist
Ernst Cohn once described another term, "closest connection," as "less than 'habitual resi-
dence' but more than mere 'abode,'" and ultimately concluded that "[alll this is disputed."
ERNST J. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW § 8.12 (2d ed. 1971). The meaning of the more com-
monly used term, "habitual residence" is also greatly disputed. See Schoenblum, supra note 12,
at 106-09.
2' He is also less likely to be able to afford quality legal counsel to assure the proper execu-
tion of a will.
" Although nationality is not defined for UPC purposes, it makes little sense as used in
§ 2-506 with reference to a United States national, since there is no national wills law in the
United States. See also infra note 34.
20 See U.P.C. § 2-506 cmt. (1991).
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domiciled in state Y, which has more stringent formalities, should
not be penalized simply because he failed to re-execute his will. The
protection of expectations is-a legitimate objective. However, if a pre-
mise underlying the UPC is that only documents with certain mini-
mal formalities or clear and convincing evidence of intent are reliable
enough to permit probate, there is no justification for allowing the
probate of an instrument that does not meet these standards.
At bottom, the choice of law rule of section 2-506 strongly suggests
a lack of serious regard for the rules and processes of validation set
forth in sections 2-502 and 2-503. If a UPC state must probate a writ-
ing that is valid elsewhere, despite its failure to satisfy minimal UPC
criteria, there seems little reason to employ those criteria at all. As
matters stand, the local standard is delegitimized by the choice of law
rule.29
Moreover, the notion that "expectations" are being fulfilled by the
choice of law rule is clearly incorrect. Section 2-506 requires no show-
ing of reliance by the testator on some other law as a condition of
validating a writing that otherwise fails to meet minimal UPC stan-
dards. Furthermore, there may be a considerable difference between
a testator's intent and expectations. The legal meaning of "expecta-
tions," and the methodology for ascertaining it, is murky and is cer-
tainly not developed by the UPC. Indeed, section 2-506 anticipates
no presentation of evidence as to expectations, as section 2-503 does
with regard to testamentary intent.30
Section 2-506 may, nonetheless, be justifiable on some other
ground, thus necessitating only a revision in the explanation cur-
rently offered in the comment rather than a revision in the section
itself.31 In fact, there is a choice of law rationale in the multistate
context. The laws and the probate processes of the states are so simi-
lar that any imagined risks are far outweighed by the efficiency of the
system assured by a liberal choice of law rule that eliminates insub-
29 The argument could be made that the forum-situs state has no interest in preventing
fraud in its courts when a citizen of another state is involved. See, e.g., Moffatt Hancock, Equi-
table Conversion and the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1099-1100
(1965); see also RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 439-40 (3d ed.
1986). But see infra note 35. Less clear is whether the situs state should defer when a transfer
of local real property is involved and the connection with another jurisdiction is simply that the
testator had an "abode" there. See generally supra note 25.
" For example, the comment following UPC § 2-503 discusses the burden of proof and
clearly states that it is on "the proponent of a defective instrument" and that the proponent
must "discharge that burden by clear and. convincing evidence (which courts at the trial and
appellate levels are urged to police with rigor) . U.P.C. § 2-503 cmt. (1991).
" See id.
1992] 1297
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stantial challenges. 32 A barrier to individual and capital mobility is
eradicated.
This justification for bypassing the formalities of sections 2-502
and 2-503, whatever its merits domestically, is certainly not persua-
sive in the international sphere.3 In some jurisdictions, fraud is ram-
pant and legal processes are pervasively corrupt. American courts are
not likely to be able to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the
execution of a foreign will. Further, there are any number of legal
systems entirely alien to our own. These may be premised on social
norms and cultural or ecclesiastical rules that have no relation to the
objectives or concerns motivating the UPC's approach to formalities
of execution. To incorporate these as part of our own model law by
an indiscriminate choice of law provision makes little sense, at least if
the drafters are truly serious about observance of certain minimal
formalities. 5 Underlying the approach of section 2-506 is an assump-
tion that all countries have equally sophisticated, similarly oriented
legal systems that function so as to assure, through a writing, the
establishment of a testator's intent. This is a most naive and also
chauvinistic perspective. 6
No doubt, there is an interest in fostering comity in the interna-
tional legal arena. That is, the argument might be presented that in
32 See, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 29, at 439-40.
3 Drawing a distinction between choice of law rules in the interstate and international con-
texts has been supported by a number of leading scholars. See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig,
Interstate and International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REV. 717
(1957); Peter Hay, International Versus Interstate Conflicts Law in the United States, 35
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 429, 471-77, 485 (1971).
" UPC § 2-506 simply assumes that a foreign country will have a national wills law, even
though the United States itself does not have one. See supra note 27. Thus, it refers to the law
of the place of which the testator "is a national." Suppose the testator is a national of a country
that has no national law, such as Canada. Alternatively, the law of a province might be consid-
ered, just as a state of the United States might be, although the matter is not addressed, nor is
it clear which state or province would be chosen. Likewise, an ambiguity exists with regard to
the law of a country that determines rights and imposes rules based on religious or tribal affilia-
tion. This would be true of much of Africa and Asia. See, e.g., 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4,
§ 18.05, at 672 (discussing India).
" Indeed, the argument can be made that the UPC ought not be concerned with protecting
the interest of certain classes of persons, such as aliens. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 29, at 400,
439-40. On the other hand, an alien who owns property in this country at death should be
entitled to the same protections against fraud and forgery as is a citizen or domiciliary. Indeed,
the UPC has already endorsed this view in a related context, by assuring elective share rights to
an alien surviving spouse whose deceased spouse was a domiciliary. See U.P.C. § 2-201(c)
(1991).
6 Note that the Hague Conference on Private International Law has refused to extend its
membership worldwide because of the lack of sophistication of certain legal systems or because
the systems, in theory or practice, are abhorrent to the current membership. See DAVID, supra
note 13, 376, at 143.
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order to assure the recognition of American wills abroad, American
states ought to recognize foreign wills, even though they may be un-
satisfactorily executed by UPC standards. This argument has the vir-
tue of explaining UPC section 2-506, even if it otherwise seems at
odds with sections 2-502 and 2-503. If comity is the goal, that goal
ought to be acknowledged candidly. Moreover, if this is the case, then
section 2-506 ought to require evidence that the foreign country is
reciprocating. UPC standards should not be abandoned until this has
been established reliably.3 7
Several technical aspects of section 2-506 are also quite troubling.
First, it refers to the "law" of certain specified places. There is no
indication whether this means the local law or the whole law, includ-
ing choice of law rules. In contrast, UPC section 2-703, which ad-
dresses choice of law as to substantive issues, refers to the "local
law." The issue is important, because a will may not be valid, for
example, under the local law of the domicile, but would be valid
under the law of another jurisdiction to which the law of the domicile
makes reference. A second and related issue is what law determines
such preliminary issues as domicile,38 nationality, place of execution,
abode, and whether local or whole law is intended.
UPC section 2-506 fails as well to address the revocation of a will.
Pursuant to section 2-507, a will may be revoked by a subsequent will
that revokes it explicitly or implicitly by inconsistency. It may also
be revoked by certain revocatory acts, if performed with the intent
and purpose of revoking the will. Section 2-506 relates only to the
execution of a will and does not apply to revocation. There is no
choice of law provision as to revocation and associated matters in the
UPC. In fact, the comment following current section 2-506 takes no
note of this issue." In contrast, the comment to pre-1990 section
2-506 did address the matter. In that earlier comment, the drafters
stated that, "[a] similar provision relating to choice of law [for revo-
cation] . ..was considered but was not included. Revocation [sic] by
subsequent instruments are covered. Revocations by act, other than
partial revocations, do not cause much difficulty in regard to choice
of laws."' 0
37 There is presently no empirical data on this point with regard to states that have adopted
UPC § 2-506 or a similar provision.
'" The concept of domicile differs considerably from one country to another. See 1
SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 9.02.
" See U.P.C. § 2-506 cmt. (1991).
, U.P.C. § 2-506 cmt. (1969).
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The significance of the redaction of this comment is unclear. It
could reflect a realization that revocation by act is a more compli-
cated matter in choice of law than was first appreciated, and cannot
be addressed in a casual manner. In light of the clear link between
execution and revocation, the choice of law dimension ought to be
addressed in conjunction with execution.
Moreover, numerous instances can be presented demonstrating the
inadequacy of section 2-506 for validating revocations by subsequent
written instrument. For example, an individual executes a will con-
sistently with the formalities of section 2-502. Following his death a
writing, is presented that is typed and signed, in accordance with
country Z law, by another person. The writing disposes of the indi-
vidual's entire estate. There ought to be concern here that a valid will
under the UPC can be overridden by a writing that does not meet
UPC standards. Furthermore, the interest of validating the party's
expectations may be defeated rather than accomplished. 41
The foregoing example suggests an additional point. Section 2-506
does not recognize dispositions that are not in writing, no matter how
reliable the proof is. 2 A foreign country may recognize an oral testa-
ment, while requiring a substantial degree of proof. A second country
may give effect to a written instrument that may not be a reliable
indicator of the testator's intent. It is submitted that the first should
be preferred over the second. The mere fact that the second is a writ-
ing is irrelevant, unless the incorrect assumption is made that a writ-
ing qua writing satisfies a level of reliability in a way that other forms
for establishing testator's intent cannot. Furthermore, the spirit of
article II is one of validation. If clear and convincing proof exists,
there is no reason why the UPC should stand in the way, at least
where the testator is a domiciliary of the other jurisdiction and mov-
able assets are involved. 8
Of course, the only sort of writing that meets the requirements of
section 2-506 is a "written will.'"4  A "will" is defined in section
1-201(56) as a "codicil and any testamentary instrument. ' ' 41 As the
prefatory note to article II states, will substitutes and other inter
vivos transfers represent "a major, if not the major, form of wealth
1 In this regard, see supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
42 See WEINTRAUB, supra note 29, at 439, for a general discussion of this issue in the context
of nuncupative wills.
4' But see supra note 29, for a different result when the connection with the other country or
its interest in the estate is less substantial and when the property is local real property.
" U.P.C. § 2-506 (1991).
41 Id. § 1-201(56).
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transmission . . . . , Rules of construction have been incorporated
into article II, part 7 that apply equally to wills and other "gov-
erning" instruments. With regard to multijurisdictional transfers,
section 2-703 addresses questions of choice of law as to meaning and
effect of a governing instrument, will or otherwise.48 Despite this ef-
fort at an integrated approach to wills and other dispositive instru-
ments, no choice of law rule is presented with regard to the formali-
ties of execution or revocation of these nontestamentary instruments.
Article VI of the UPC sets forth the formal requirements of various
nonprobate instruments.' 9 No provision exists for validating a non-
probate transfer instrument that does not comply with these require-
ments, even though it is in writing and in compliance with the re-
quirements of another jurisdiction. The limitation of section 2-506 to
"written will[s]" is entirely out of keeping with the UPC's integrative
approach and the recognition of the importance of these other docu-
ments as dispositive instruments." If a dispositive, testamentary
writing valid under foreign law is valid in a UPC state, there is no
persuasive reason why a "nontestamentary" instrument accomplish-
ing essentially the same purpose should not be. On the other hand, if
there is concern in the nontestamentary context, there probably
should be similar concern with regard to written wills.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL WILL-AN INADEQUATE SOLUTION TO THE
FORM PROBLEM
Part 10 of article II adopts as part of the UPC, in modified and
renumbered form, the provisions of the Convention Providing a Uni-
form Law on the Form of an International Will ("Convention"),
which was a product of the Washington Conference of October 26,
1973.51 In large part the Convention is intended to provide individu-
als with multijurisdictional estates a standard form for disposing of
wealth, which form will be given recognition around the world. 2 Only
recently, and approximately 18 years after being signed on behalf of
the United States, the United States Senate ratified the Conven-
46 See U.P.C. art. II, prefatory note (1991).
'7 See U.P.C. art. II, pt. 7 gen. cmt. (1991) (comment on rules of construction).
, For a discussion" of this provision, see infra text accompanying notes 132-52.
, U.P.C. art. VI (1991).
50 U.P.C. § 2-506 (1991).
5' The full text of the Convention is republished in the prefatory note to article II, part 10.
See U.P.C. art. II, pt. 10 prefatory note (1991).
12 See generally id.
1992] 1301.
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tion.8 Some, but by no means all, UPC states had previously enacted
the UPC version.54
A most important point about this Convention is that the ratifica-
tion process has been handled in a most responsible manner. The di-
versity of legal regimes around the world and the complex interaction
of these regimes when joining in a single set of rules, requires the
most careful and extended period of review. The experience with the
Convention should serve as a model for other pending conventions
that effect substantive aspects of gratuitous transfers.5
Most significantly, the Convention shows due respect for the allo-
cation of wealth-transfer matters to the states. While the federal gov-
ernment could almost certainly enter this area of law as a constitu-
tional matter," this would have enormous consequences from the
standpoint of our system of federalism. It would also likely transform
estates practice. These concerns have been avoided because the Sen-
ate has acted so that each state can decide whether it will enact the
provisions of the Convention into its own law.57
The great virtue of the "international will" introduced by the Con-
vention is that it eliminates a number of difficult issues inherent in a
choice of law provision such as UPC section 2-506. For example, a
written will is valid under section 2-506 if executed in accordance
with the law of domicile, country of nationality, or place of abode.
The sometimes difficult inquiry as to whether a decedent had the
requisite affiliation 6 need not be pursued if an international will is
used. Furthermore, the very woodenness of this inquiry into technical
affiliation, detached as it is from the fundamental policy of effectuat-
ing the testator's intent, is avoided. The often difficult and essentially
6s Ratification occurred on Aug. 2, 1991. Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form
of an International Will, 137 CONG. REC. S12131 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991).
Eight states have adopted part 10 or the freestanding version, designated the Uniform
International Wills Act. The relevant statutes are: CAL. PROB. CODE § 6380 (Deering 1991);
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-1001 (1987 & Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-1 (West Supp.
1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 50 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-
1001 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-901 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.2-01 (Supp.
1991);.OR. REV. STAT. § 112.232 (1991).
s1 E.g. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Convention on the Law Applicable
to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons, and Final Act of Sixteenth Session, October
20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 146 (1989) [hereinafter Hague Conference]; Hague Conference on Private
International Law: Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, and
Final Act of the Fifteenth Session, Oct. 20, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1388 (1984).
See 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 15.05, at 471-72.
See generally S. REP. No. 102-9, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991). But see infra text accom-
panying note 96.
's See, e.g., supra notes 25, 27, 38. See generally 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, ch. 8 (listing
the various factors entering into a determination of domicile).
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futile task of determining the substance of the relevant foreign law"
and whether it has been complied with is completely obviated. Addi-
tionally, the failure of UPC section 2-506 and similar statutory provi-
sions to validate a will on the basis that it is valid at the situs of
assets is overcome.60
Despite the foregoing, the Convention, as adopted by the UPC, is
not without its problems. Some of these are highly technical in na-
ture and, with a few exceptions, will not be addressed here. Others
will receive more in-depth scrutiny since they appear to undercut and
contradict other provisions of UPC article II.
The first concern that might be raised is that the international will
can be used even when there is no international dimension to an es-
tate.6' In fact, this should not be much of a concern since the interna-
tional will is actually more demanding from the standpoint of formal-
ities than is required under section 2-502. The will must have two
witnesses.6 " It must be signed by the witnesses and "an authorized
person."63 The testator must publish the will"" and he must sign or
acknowledge it.65 If someone else signs the will there must be a nota-
tion on the instrument as to the reason why.6 The testator, the au-
thorized person, and the witnesses must all sign at the end of the
will.67 Each sheet of the will must be signed by the testator or his
' For the difficulties associated with proof of foreign law, see, for example, Stephen L. Sass,
Foreign Law in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Survey, 16 AM. J. COmp. L. 332 (1968); see also,
ROBERT LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 356 (4th ed. 1984); Eugene F. Scoles & Peter
Hay, Conflict of Laws § 12.15 (2d ed. 1992); Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Pri-
vate International Law, 143 RECUEIL DES COURs D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 440
(1974). See generally Schoenblum, supra note 12, at 129-34.
60 If a testator follows the traditional situs rule with regard to real property, the forum,
which is also likely to be the situs state ought to respect compliance with that law, especially if
it is its own, as much as it would the law, for example, of the place of abode, whether based on
an interests analysis or a connector basis. UPC § 2-506 fails to credit this factor,- even though
the testator might act on the reasonable expectation that property ought to be disposed of in
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction where situated. The importance of testator expecta-
tions under the UPC is discussed supra text accompanying note 30.
U.P.C. § 2-1001 cmt. (1991).
02 Id. § 2-1003(b).
08 Id. § 2-1003(e). For a discussion of the authorized person, see infra text accompanying
notes 93-99.
O4 U.P.C. § 2-1003(b) (1991).
05 Id. § 2-1003(c).
00 Id. § 2-1003(d).
Id. § 2-1004(a). Although stated in mandatory terms, the failure to observe this "require-
ment" will not invalidate the will. See id. § 2-1004(d). The precise status of mandatory provi-
sions that do not invalidate the instrument if not observed is murky. Quoting from the Explan-
atory Report of the Washington Convention prepared by Jean-Pierre Plantard, the comment to
UPC § 2-1004 indicates that the provisions, though "not imposed on pain of invalidity" are
"compulsory legal provisions which can involve sanctions, for example, the professional, civil
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surrogate and numbered."8 The will must bear the date that the au-
thorized person signed it and the date is to be noted at the end of the
will by the authorized person, 69 who is required to ask the testator
whether he wishes to make a declaration concerning the safekeeping
of the will.70 The authorized person is also required to sign and at-
tach a certificate in a specified form, verifying that the required for-
malities have been observed.7 The authorized person keeps a copy of
the certificate and delivers another copy to the testator, in addition
to the-one appended to the will.72
As noted, since the formalities required by the Convention are at
least as stringent as those called for by UPC section 2-502,11 the use
of the international will domestically should present no serious prob-
lem. In any event, there would be no point to seek to limit the in-,
ternational will to "international estates," because there would be too
great a difficulty in defining what is an international estate.74
The principal difficulty with the international will is that it ap-
pears to offer more than it actually delivers. Indeed, it may engender
undue and dangerous reliance on its provisions. Most notably, it does
not guarantee avoidance of "local proof of foreign law," as claimed by
the prefatory note to part 10 of UPC article 1I.7 The notion that this
instrument can simply be introduced in the forum court and probate
will proceed unhindered with respect to local assets is a superficial
misconception of how the international will is likely to work.
Presently, if a party seeks to introduce a will that does not comply
with UPC sections 2-502 or 2-503, but does meet foreign standards
pursuant to section 2-506, the will should be admitted to probate.
There may be an ex parte procedure or one with limited notice in
which a representation is made as to foreign law.76 This method of
and even criminal liability of the authorized person, according to the provisions of the law from
which he derives his authority." Id. § 2-1004 cmt. (quotation marks omitted).
68 U.P.C. § 2-1004(a) (1991). This provision, though mandatory, does not result in invalidity.
See supra note 67.
69 U.P.C. § 2-1004(b) (1991). This provision, though mandatory, does not result in invalidity.
See supra note 67.
'0 U.P.C. § 2-1004(c) (1991). This provision, though mandatory, does not result in invalidity.
See supra note 67.
"' U.P.C. § 2-1005 (1991). Under UPC § 2-1006, failure to attach the prescribed certificate
will not invalidate the will. See also supra note 67.
72 U.P.C. § 2-1005 (1991).
7' See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
7, In this regard, see supra note 33 and infra text accompanying notes 175-77. See also
U.P.C. § 2-1001 cmt. (1991).
8 See U.P.C. art. II, pt. 10 prefatory note (1991).
76 See, e.g., U.P.C. § 3-301 (1991) (relating to informal probate).
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validating a foreign will is no more onerous than the steps that would
be required if an international will were submitted for probate. In
fact, the international will cannot be validated if certain of its nu-
merous technical requirements have not been observed.7 The docu-
ment will have to be reviewed by the court to assure compliance. 8
Of course, there may be a will contest by those who would take if
the will is invalidated. If one contention is that the formalities of the
relevant foreign law have not been observed, there will be an argu-
ment over the content of that law and proof will have to be received
on this point. The international will is advertised as bypassing this
proof process. As noted, however, there will have to be proof as to
compliance with the Convention itself. Indeed, UPC section 2-1008
clearly anticipates controversies regarding interpretation and applica-
tion of the Convention .7  However, in resolving these controversies
forum law alone is not to be considered. Rather, local probate judges
are to recognize the international character of the provisions and "to
work towards elaborating a sort of common caselaw, taking account
of the foreign legal systems which provide the foundation for the
Uniform Law and the decisions handed down on the same text by the
courts of other countries. ' '80 Furthermore, practicing lawyers are not
to interpret "the Uniform Law solely in terms of the principles of
their respective internal law, as this would prejudice the international
unification being sought after. '81
As difficult as it may be currently to prove foreign law, there is at
least a set of legal rules from the pertinent jurisdiction. In the case of
the international will, there is, apparently, to be no such particular-
ized frame of reference. Rather, section 2-1008 would seem to impose
an affirmative duty upon practicing attorneys and judges to ascertain
decisional law in other foreign jurisdictions regarding the interna-
" See supra text accompanying notes 62-66 for the requirements that must be observed.
78 In this regard, article III of the UPC dealing with probate, ought to be revised to take
account of the International Will. For example, UPC § 3-303(c) provides that a "will which
appears to have the required signature and which contains an attestation clause showing that
requirements of execution under Section 2-502, 2-503 or 2-506 have been met'shall be probated
without further proof." U.P.C. § 3-303(c) (1991). Reference should also be made to the require-
ments of UPC § 2-1003 in the case of an international will.
7 9
.The comment to UPC § 2-1005 specifically asks: "May an international will be contested?"
U.P.C. § 2-1005 cmt. (1991). The answer offered, in relevant part, is in the affirmative: "Con-
tests based on failure to follow mandatory requirements of execution are not precluded .
Id.
80 Id. § 2-1008 cmt. (quotation marks omitted). Section 2-1008 actually states, "In interpret-
ing and applying this Act [Part], regard shall be had to its international origin and to the need
for uniformity in its interpretation." Id.
81 Id.
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tional will. 82 Left unanswered by this provision are a series of ques-
tions, including the following:
(1) If the attorneys fail to inform the court of these foreign deci-
sions, must the judge independently determine their existence and
holdings?
(2) Assuming there is no clearinghouse for such decisions, how will
a local probate judge determine their existence?
(3) If the decisions are not in English, who will translate them from
a variety of foreign languages?8 3
(4) Must a decision of a lower foreign court be followed or can the
court ignore decisions on appeal?
(5) Can the local American probate court base a decision on its
view of what a foreign high court will decide?
(6) How is a local American probate judge to grasp the significance
of decisions -rendered in the contexts of several entirely different legal
systems? 4
(7) Must the local American probate court follow earlier foreign
decisions or can it disagree with them altogether, even if the foreign
decisions are uniform?
(8) Can a local decision be appealed on the ground that it fails to
foster international uniformity based on foreign decisions, even if its
construction of the law appears to be correct by American standards?
(9) If the international will is being employed in an entirely domes-
tic estate context, must the local American probate court still give
effect to foreign decisions?
In addition to these proof of foreign law issues under section
2-1008, difficulties are likely to arise as well under UPC section
2-1006. A certification process is specified and it is to be "conclusive
of the formal validity of the instrument as a will under this Act."'
However, this statement is prefaced by the statement, "[in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary." '86 Thus, any international will, de-
82 See id.
8 Note that the international will need not be in English. U.P.C. § 2-1003(a) (1991). Thus,
the will may have to be translated before a determination can be made whether it complies
with all requirements. The parties may disagree on the translation of the will as well as on the
translation of foreign decisions.
" Recent legal scholarship raises serious questions about the predilections and biases judges
bring to the adjudicatory process on the domestic scene, as well as emphasizing the considera-
ble disagreement that exists regarding statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Symposium, A Re-
evaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 528 (1992). Without
consensus in this country, how can a judge be expected to make a sound judgment as to the
significance of or even understand a diversity of foreign decisions?
85 U.P.C. § 2-1006 (1991).
86 Id.
1306 [Vol. 55
HeinOnline  -- 55 Alb. L. Rev. 1306 1991-1992
19921 Multijurisdictional Estates 1307
spite its certification, would be subject to challenge precisely like any
other will."7 Certainly, this would be true of all challenges based on
nonformal grounds. It would also be true of certain, but by no means
all, challenges based on nonobservance of formalities.8" While the sig-
natures of the testator and witnesses are explicitly not subject to
challenge, that of the authorized person would be, as would his vari-
ous affirmations in the certificate.89
Thus, again the purported certainty accompanying reliance on the
international will is more ephemeral than first appears to be the case.
Still, this does not mean the international will will fail. Minor devia-
tions from the prescribed form of certificate, however, are permit-
ted.90 Even if there are more substantial flaws established, it will not
be fatal, since the certificate is not required."1 Moreover, even if one
of the "mandatory" formalities set forth in section 2-1003 is not met,
thereby invalidating the instrument as an international will, section
2-1002(b) recognizes that it might still be established as a valid will
under the local law of the forum.
Apart from challenges on technical grounds, reliance upon the
Convention could prove fruitless until it becomes widely accepted in-
87 See U.P.C. § 2-1005 cmt. (1991).
88 See id.
89 Although not incorporated into the text of part 10 of the UPC, article VI of the Conven-
tion is referred to in the comment to UPC § 2-1005. See U.P.C. § 2-1005 cmt. (1991). Article VI
states that the signature of the testator, witnesses, and authorized person, "shall be exempt
from any legalization or like formality." Id. On the other hand, article VI(2) states that.a coun-
try may "satisfy themselves as to the authenticity of the signature of the authorized person"
and "the prohibition against legalization would not preclude additional proof of genuineness if
evidence tending to show forgery is introduced." Id. The precise impact of article VI, as well as
certain other provisions of the Convention, is not clear. To the extent these provisions are not
incorporated into part 10, and there is no explicit language to this effect in the UPC, they
should, perhaps, not be enforced. On the other hand, it appears the intention of the UPC draft-
ers was to enact the entire Convention. As a result of the United States ratification, a state
could adopt the Convention itself. Alternatively, it might just enact the UPC, or just enact
certain portions of the Convention or the UPC version independent of the federal enactment.
For example, it is unclear whether article VI is part of the law of a state that-enacted the
provisions set forth in part 10, but did not even reprint, as part of the enactment, the Conven-
tion or the UPC comments referring to the Convention. See also infra notes 104-05, 110.
90 See U.P.C. § 2-1005 cmt. (1991). The comment states, however, that this should not be
read "as authorizing him to depart from this form; it only serves to allow for small changes of
detail which might be useful in the interests of improving its comprehensibility or presenta-
tion." Id. (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, all 14 particulars of the certificate must be
included. "The 14 particulars indicated on the certificate are numbered. These numbers must
be reproduced on each certificate . . . ." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
91 See U.P.C. § 2-1006 (1991). On the other hand, in this situation "proof that the formalities
prescribed on pain of invalidity, have been carried out will have to be produced in accordance
with the legal procedures applicable in each State which has adopted the Uniform Law." U.P.C.
§ 2-1006 cmt. (1991).
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ternationally. A UPC state will have to give effect to an international
will when a foreigner resorts to it. Yet, there will be no assurance
that a citizen of the UPC state will be entitled to have the same rec-
ognition accorded her international will with regard to the passage of
property situated in a foreign country. The foreign country, or prov-
ince or state therein, may not be a party to the Convention. Further-
more, even if it is a party, its judiciary may interpret the Convention
differently or be subject to local influences or public policy concerns
that block its enforcement.92
Central to the international will is the role of the "authorized per-
son." Each jurisdiction is to designate who may act "in its territory"
as the "authorized person,"' 3 the person charged with supervising the
ceremony and executing the certificate that accompanies the will. 94
Thus, an American executing an international will in Paris would
have to use an authorized person under French law, not under Amer-
ican law. A Californian would have to use an authorized person under
Oregon law, if executing the will in Oregon. This represents no real
advance over the present situation-currently, a foreign executed will
would typically require the retention of the services of a local attor-
ney or notary. Indeed, UPC section 2-1009 would limit persons in any
state of the United States who can be authorized persons to members
of the local bar "in good standing as active law practitioners."9 It is
uncertain whether this is intended to exclude certain members of the
bar otherwise allowed to practice, but not doing so on an "active"
As of October.20, 1992, the countries in which the Convention has entered into force are
Belgium, several Canadian provinces, Cyprus, Ecuador, Italy, Libya, Niger, Portugal, and
Yugoslavia.
Note that the law of the country of the authorized person may be controlling on certain
issues, rather than the internal law of the forum or the specific rules of the Convention itself.
For example, if the authorized person's law requires safekeeping of the will, this "national law"
must be observed, even though the Convention does not require it. See U.P.C. § 2-1004(c) &
cmt. (1991).
's U.P.C. art. II, pt. 10 prefatory note (1991) (quoting article III of the Washington Conven-
tion). Part 10 of the UPC itself does not make such provision. However, it seems to be incorpo-
rated by reference in the comment to UPC § 2-1005. See id. § 2-1005 cmt.
"4 See, e.g., U.P.C. §§ 2-1003(b), 2-1004(a), (c), 2-1005 (1991).
" This provision is, presumably, included in accordance with article III of the Convention,
permitting each contracting party to designate the authorized persons in its territory. The Con-
vention, itself, does not limit authorized persons to attorneys. The Report of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, reporting favorably on the Senate's advice and consent to ratification, antici-
pates a phase during which individual states "will have to subscribe by their own legislation to
a 'Uniform International Wills Act' [enacted by Congress] and will need to designate an 'au-
thorized person as described in the Convention.'" S. REP. No. 9, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991).
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basis. Furthermore, it is not clear that paralegals" or other persons,
though not lawyers, could be authorized persons. Nothing in the Con-
vention bars a foreign country from permitting such persons or even
unskilled individuals from performing the role of authorized
persons."'
In addition to local bar members, section 2-1001(2) provides that
the United States may appoint as authorized persons "members of
the diplomatic and consular service of the United States designated
by Foreign Service Regulations. 9 8 This provision is quite misleading.
It fails to take account of article II(1) of the Convention itself, which
limits the exercise of such authority to cases where local law permits
this.9 Thus, before an American can execute an 'international will
before an American consular officer in a foreign country, he will have
to confirm that the foreign country permits these persons to serve as
authorized persons on its territory. Formal confirmation of this au-
thority will be critical, since the question of proper authorization at
execution may be raised years later at the time of the testator's
death.
In addition to confirming the approval of the authorized person by
the place of execution, confirmation will have to be obtained that the
United States has authorized consular officials to perform this role
and has registered their status as authorized persons with the State
96 See, e.g., U.P.C. art. II, pt. 10 prefatory note (1991) (recognizing the possibility of parale-
gals serving as authorized persons). The State Department has expressed concern "about the
attendant burden on the U.S. as Depositary Government, of receiving, keeping up to date, and
interpreting to foreign governments the results of fifty different state licensing systems."
S. REP. No. 102-9, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991). Nevertheless, the Senate Report recom-
mending advice and consent to ratification anticipates 50 distinct designations. Id. This repre-
sents an implicit repudiation of the UPC position by the Senate. The comment to UPC § 2-
1001 explains that the reference in UPC § 2-1001(2) to authorized persons empowered "by the
laws of the United States" anticipates that "Congress, pursuant to the obligation of the Con-
vention, will enact the annexed uniform law and include therein some designation, possibly of a
cadre only, of authorized persons." U.P.C. § 2-1001 cmt. (1991).
A distinction must be drawn between a state's power to refuse to subscribe to a Uniform
International Wills Act or designate an authorized person on the one hand and a state's obliga-
tion to probate an international will from another jurisdiction. As a result of implementing
legislation to be enacted by Congress, there will be provision "for the recognition of interna-
tional wills throughout the United States." S; REP. No. 102-9, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991).
See generally David Quam, The Resurgence of the International Will 25-29 (unpublished man-
uscript on file with the Albany Law Review). This will constitute a federal intrusion into an
area historically reserved to the states, as reflected in the state statutes cited supra note 23.
o See supra note 93. However, see the comment to UPC § 2-1003, which quotes from the
explanatory report, in which the author of the report states that the authorized person "will
necessarily be a practicing lawyer." U.P.C. § 2-1003 cmt. (1991).
" U.P.C. § 2-1001(2) (1991).
" See U.P.C. art. II, pt. 10 prefatory note (1991) (article II of the Convention).
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Department, the depositary for the Convention.0 " The same is true
of authorized persons approved by foreign governments. It is unclear
whether reliance can be placed on an "authorized person" if the State
Department has not been notified or if the person's authority has
been withdrawn, but the State Department has not been informed.101
The problem for the nonresident alien is particularly acute. Before
a Frenchman', for example, can execute an international will in New
York under the auspices of a French consular officer, he must not
only confirm that this authority is on record in Washington, but that
the state of New York has also approved this exercise of authority.
That is to say, "local law" determines whether a foreign official can
serve as an authorized person and local law would, presumably, mean
the individual enacting state and not the United States, although the
question is not free from doubt. Of course, a foreigner would also face
the problem of nonrecognition with respect to property in states that
have not enacted the terms of the Convention. Moreover, even some
of those states adopting the Convention may not recognize foreign
officials as authorized persons.
There are other problems with the international will as well. It ap-
pears to expose practitioners to considerable risk of liability. One as-
pect of this has already been noted, in that practitioners must be
aware of foreign law in construing and advising on the terms of the
Convention.0 2 Another aspect relates to various formalities, such as
dating the will and the testator signing at the end of the document as
well as on each page. These are not mandatory in the sense that the
will is otherwise invalidated. However, the attorney supervising exe-
cution would appear to have responsibility to see that these formali-
ties are observed, at least if he is acting as an unauthorized person.
Failure to do so would, in fact, give rise to potential liability. 0
Others, serving as authorized persons would likewise face liability.
Left unanswered is the question why, if the will is valid despite non-
observance of certain formalities, the attorney or other individual
100 The United States must be notified under article 11(2) of the Convention. See also U.P.C.
§ 2-1006 cmt. (1991) ("[P]ersons interested in local probate of an international will from an-
other country will be enabled to determine from the Department of State whether the official
making the certificate in which they are interested had the requisite authority.").
"' See generally 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 15.05, at 463-64 (discussion of this issue).
102 See supra text accompanying note 81.
1o See U.P.C. § 2-1006 cmt. (1991). The comment to UPC § 2-1006 also quotes from the
Convention's Explanatory Report, which declares that the authorized person, who fails to as-
sure compliance with these formalities "would lay himself open to an action based on his pro-
fessional and civil liability. He could even expose himself to sanctions laid down by his national
law." Id. Quaere as to the measure of damages, since no injury will have been suffered.
.[Vol. 551310
HeinOnline  -- 55 Alb. L. Rev. 1310 1991-1992
Multijurisdictional Estates
acting as an authorized person may be liable for failure to comply
with these nonmandatory formalities?
While the international will does not purport to intrude into sub-
stantive matters, this is not entirely the case. For example, the quali-
fication of the two witnesses to the international will must be deter-
mined under the law of the country designating the authorized
person.104 Thus, an American court would have to determine whether
an international will of a foreigner executed abroad had met the sub-
stantive witness requirements of the authorized person's country.
The international will, in this regard, fails to eliminate the need to
refer to foreign law. Furthermore, it actually complicates the process.
The law referred to is that of the authorized person, not that of the
law of the domicile of the testator or the situs of assets, as would
ordinarily be the case on substantive matters. Since qualification of
witnesses is a matter of substance and not form, the effect of the
Convention is to alter choice of law principles in a way that goes be-
yond the Convention's stated scope.
The foregoing witness qualification provision may not apply if
UPC part 10 is enacted independent of the Convention, since the
Convention's article V witness qualification provision is not included
in part 10 of the UPC. In light of the recent ratification of the Con-
vention, however, non-UPC states may give effect to the interna-
tional will by enacting the Convention directly, rather than by simply
enacting part 10 of UPC article II. Moreover, even if part 10 of the
UPC and not the Convention itself, is enacted, this may nonetheless,
be regarded as one implicit incorporation of the terms of the Conven-
tion, which is the source. Unfortunately, the matter is far from clear.
In the end, a network of differently construed international wills laws
may prove to be the unfortunate product of efforts to overcome the
o4 This requirement is in article V of the Convention itself, but is not reflected directly in
part 10 of the UPC. While the Article would appear to apply in UPC states, the matter is not
free from doubt. See supra note 89. See Kurt Nadelmann, The Formal Validity of Wills and
the Washington Convention 1973: Providing the Form of an International Will, 22 AM. J.
COMP. L. 365, 372 (1974).
If the authorized person is a consular official of the United States, there is no certainty as to
which state's law should apply. Alternatively, federal rules could be adopted, although this was
not suggested by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. See S. REP. No. 9, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1991). Likewise, suppose the consular officials'are from a country that does not
require witnesses to a will. See 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 15.05, at 465. No satisfactory
solutions to these problems have been presented. One author has simply proposed bypassing
normal legislative processes and having the Foreign Office or State Department of a particular
country give instructions as to qualification of witnesses. See Richard D. Kearney, The In-
ternational Wills Convention, 18 INT'L LAW. 613, 626 (1984).
19921 1311
HeinOnline  -- 55 Alb. L. Rev. 1311 1991-1992
Albany Law Review
current worldwide diversity of requirements regarding formalities by
adopting the international will.105
In striking fashion, the UPC eschews any provision regarding revo-
cation of the international will on the ground that this is a matter
relating to substance rather than form. 06 This approach is highly un-
fortunate, since it impairs the utility of the international will. An in-
dividual is likely to execute more than one will prior to his death.
Yet, section 2-1007 simply states that.the "international will shall be
subject to the ordinary rules of revocation of wills."' 07 It does not
state which jurisdiction's law of revocation governs; nor whether that
revocation will be recognized in all jurisdictions giving effect to the
international will. In light of the significance of the authorized person
and the determination of witness qualification under his law, the con-
clusion might be drawn that the law of the authorized person should
control revocation. On the other hand, the traditional, unsettled
choice of law rules that generally focus on domicile and situs might
be deemed controlling.' o The key point is that there is little appeal
to executing a form of will when uncertainty shrouds the law gov-
erning its revocation. Even though the Convention does not address
revocation, part 10 of the UPC could and should do so. A precise
procedure consistent with will execution formalities must be adopted
if the international will is to receive wide use.
The curious failure to address the revocation issue is paralleled by
an inexplicable lack of concern regarding the authenticity of the tes-
tator's signature. Under both the Convention'0 e and, apparently, part
10 of article II,110 no challenge can be mounted to the authenticity of
100 At least five different wills regimes can be envisioned: (1) states that adhere to the tradi-
tional choice of law rules; (2) states that adopt a more expansive approach like UPC § 2-506,
but do not adopt the Convention; (3) states that adopt the Convention; (4) states that adopt
the UPC part 10 version, without adopting the Convention; (5) states that adopt the UPC
version and the Convention. Among the states adopting the Convention in some form, there
may also be a diversity of approach in terms of permissable authorized persons named.
The relationship of UPC part 10 to the articles of the Convention not explicitly embodied in
the UPC sections constituting part 10 is left particularly unclear. See supra note 89. While the
comments accompanying the provisions of part 10 indicate its derivative character, nowhere do
they actually incorporate the provisions of the Convention proper. Yet, the Annex of the Con-
vention, which has been reshaped into UPC part 10, hinges on these important articles.
,o See U.P.C. § 2-1007 (1991).
107 Id.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. See also 1 SCHOENBLUM,' supra note 4, at
§§ 14.06 & 15.06.4.
'0' U.P.C. art. II, pt. 10 prefatory note (1991) (article VI of the Convention).
"I The situation under part 10 is.unclear. There is no explicit prohibition against authenti-
cation by the forum. However, the comment to UPC § 2-1005 points out that article VI of the
Convention is "relevant" as to whether "a probate court may require additional proof of the
1312 [Vol. 55
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the signature if the authorized person has signed the accompanying
certificate. In the international context this is especially troubling,
because the standard applied by the United States with regard to
attorneys as the only permissible authorized agents is likely to be
considerably higher than in certain other countries. Also, verification
of authorized agent status in a foreign country will not always be pos-
sible, especially years after the fact of execution. Thus, the potential
for fraud on the one hand and unending challenges on the other is
considerable."' As with so much involving the international will, the
aspiration far exceeds the reality of what has been accomplished. At
least part 10 can be strengthened so as to afford greater reliability for
genuineness of signatures by testators and witnesses." U.P.C. § 2-1005 cmt. (1991). The com-
ment then quotes from the explanatory report of the Convention regarding the authenticity of
the signature of the authorized person. It proceeds to state: "Presumably, the prohibition
against legalization would not preclude additional proof of genuineness if evidence tending to
show forgery is introduced, but without contrary proof, the certificate proves the will." Id. This
quoted passage seems to be referring to authenticating the authorized person's signature, not
the other signatures. However, it is quite. ambiguous. The statutory or Convention authority
permitting challenging even the authorized person's signature is also uncertain, since no such
provision appears in the Convention itself.
The signature on the international will need not be that of the testator. An authorized
person can sign, as long as he notes the incapacity "and the reasons therefor" on the certificate.
U.P.C. § 2-1003(d) (1991). If the legal system of the authorized person permits it, a third per-
son can sign for the testator. In this case, the authorized person is simply to note this fact on
the certificate. The "source of this signature" need not be explained, although the authorized
person must still indicate the reason for the testator's failure to sign. See id. § 2-1003 cmt. For
a general critique of the signature provisions, see Clifford Hall, Towards a Uniform Law of
Wills: The Washington Convention 1973, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 851, 859 (i974). But see
Kearney, supra note 103, at 623 (dismissing concerns about the signature requirements; the
author, Ambassador Richard D. Kearney, served as the president of the Washington Confer-
ence). When the list of countries where the Convention has entered into force is considered, see
supra note 92, this author believes that there is ample reason to have some concern regarding
the reliability of the signatures on the instrument.
Issues may also be raised due to the fact that the international will can be in a language
other than that of the testator. See U.P.C. § 2-1003 cmt. (1991) ("It will be noted that the
Uniform Law does not even require the will to be written in a language known by the testa-
tor."). The comment assures that this poses no risk since the testator will know the contents of
the international will pursuant to articles 4 and 10 of the Annex to the Convention. UPC
§§ 2-1003(b), 2-1005. However, the first of these provisions simply requires a declaration by the
testator in the presence of witnesses that the document is his will and he knows the contents.
The second provision relates to the certificate attached by the authorized person. Neither pro-
vision assures actual knowledge by the testator of the contents of his foreign language will.
Furthermore, the requirement of publication, UPC § 2-1003(b), is unclear. For example, it is
uncertain whether the witnesses and authorized person have to sign in each other's presence.
The meaning of "presence" is left unsettled, as is what will qualify as an appropriate acknowl-
edgement if the will has previously been signed. See generally 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4,
§ 15.05, at466-467 & n.24; Hall, supra note 111.
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those resorting to it, unlike the Convention itself,. which may not be
revised piecemeal.112
IV. SUBSTANTIVE CHOICE OF LAW RULES
A most striking omission in the revision of article II is the failure
to address issues of choice of law in a comprehensive manner. As
noted earlier,113 this may be ascribable to the aspiration for a uniform
body of law adopted nationwide, thereby obviating the need for con-
cern over choice of law. Still, an ambitious project such as the UPC
ought to devise rules that can mediate conflicts with regard to wealth
connected to more than one jurisdiction in the period prior to its
hoped for nationwide adoption. This is all the more important, since
there is no expectation that the UPC will achieve worldwide applica-
tion. Thus, international conflicts will persist.
At present, courts in UPC states appear to be falling back on tradi-
tional choice of law rules in resolving conflicts. " 4 In the absence of
specific provisions, this is the inevitable consequence of UPC section
1-301, which makes the Code applicable to domiciliaries of the state,
property of nonresidents located in the state, and trusts subject to
administration in the state.115 Even among UPC states there may be
differences in construction of provisions that call for a resolution of a
conflict of laws.
One approach for the UPC would be to follow the model of a num-
ber of states that have legislated relatively straightforward choice of
law rules. New York affords one such example of this. " 6 Most re-
cently, Louisiana has enacted a comprehensive set of provisions. 1 7
To date, the UPC has addressed these issues on a piecemeal and
disjointed basis. A leading example of this approach is the treatment
of the elective share. The revised part 2 of article II fails to take
12 See art. II, pt. 10 prefatory note (1991) (Convention article VIII).
118 See text accompanying supra note 13.
14 See, e.g., In re Estate of Wimbush, 587 P.2d 796, 799 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978); In re Estate
of Swanson, 397 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); In re Estate of Allen,.772 P.2d 297,
298 (Mont. 1989).
118 Once jurisdiction is asserted, a court has to decide whether to apply its local law or that of
another jurisdiction. UPC courts have looked, as other courts have, to traditional rules of domi-
cile law for personal property and situs law for real property. See cases listed supra note 114.
Apart from this failure to address the choice of law problem, the lack of precision in drafting
is apparent. For example, § 1-301, dealing with the territorial application of the UPC, draws a
contrast between domiciliaries and "nonresidents," rather than "domiciliaries" and
"nondomiciliaries." See U.P.C. § 1-301 (1991).
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-5.1 (McKinney 1981).
H LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 3528-3534 (West Supp. 1992).
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account of the fact that elective-share property may well be situated
in more than one state or country and may be owned in some juris-
dictions in a form other than outright.
UPC section 2-201(a) specifically provides that "[t]he surviving
spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled in this State has a right of
election." '118 Section 2-201(c) is a corollary provision that provides
that the right of a nondomiciliary decedent's spouse is to be deter-
mined by the law of the decedent's domicile.119 Other than these two
provisions, there are none that address issues of the multijurisdic-
tional estate. The accompanying comments also fail to consider the
issue.
To the extent that real property is situated outside of a UPC-state,
there is a great likelihood that the situs state or foreign country will
not defer to the UPC domiciliary state.12 0 Nevertheless, the computa-
tion of the augmented estate under section 2-202 will be based on all
assets, "wherever situated," 12 even though many of them will be un-
reachable. This will have the unfortunate effect of imposing a harsh
burden on those nonspouse beneficiaries entitled to assets that hap-
pen to be situated in the domiciliary state or some compliant third
state, since the spouse's share will have to be funded from their as-
sets that otherwise would have been transferred to them.
Another fundamental issue that deserves attention is whether
wooden reliance on the domicile law by the UPC is justified. There is
no evidence that any extensive consideration was given to this choice
of law rule, the assumption, apparently, being made that the domicile
of the decedent, as the center of his interests, should absolutely de-
termine rights in his property worldwide. Suppose, however, that
only the surviving spouse is a domiciliary of a UPC state, but the
decedent was not. In this case, there would not seem to be a basis for
the UPC state providing the surviving spouse with an elective share
out of locally situated property of the decedent. Yet, the state in
which the surviving spouse is domiciled would seem to have a strong
interest in assuring her welfare and effectuating its policies regarding,
118 U.P.C. § 2-201(a) (1991).
Id. § 2-201(c).
120 As a constitutional matter, the state in which property is located at the death of the
owner has jurisdiction over that property. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977).
It could choose to apply its own law, as is typically the case. In general, the choice of law is
constitutionally permissible as long as it is "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." All-
state Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981); see also Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797 (1985).
"I See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-202(a)(1)(iv), (b)(2) (1991).
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for example, the partnership theory of marriage 12 2 or, alternatively,
the support theory of marriage 12  recognized by the UPC. The dece-
dent's assets in the state should be available to carry out these
policies.
In the typical case, of course, the spouses will be domiciled in the
same state. However, the duration of their domicile, perhaps, ought
to be relevant, just as the length of their marriage now is for deter-
mining the amount of the elective share. 24 For example, if all prop-
erty was acquired while in a state that does not adhere to the UPC
system of election and the decedent lived in the UPC state for only a
few months, there seems less basis for imposing the UPC regime. It
would generally counteract the parties' expectations and Would im-
pose a severe penalty on the decedent for moving to the state shortly
before death. The case for the elective share would be especially weak
if the surviving spouse were to return to the original marital domicile.
In the somewhat analogous situation of a move between common law
and community property states, 25 the character of the property is
preserved. Thus, when a couple retires, for example, to Arizona, their
rights with regard to a lifetime of acquired property are not suddenly
transformed. 2
Section 2-201 is also troubling. Under this provision, if a nondomi-
ciliary resident of a UPC state dies owning property in the state, his
nondomiciliary, resident surviving spouse would have no protection
under the UPC. Yet, if a policy behind the elective share provision is
the marital partnership or support theory, that state policy should
not necessarily be limited to domiciliaries. The widow may continue
to reside in the state. By not providing protection to her through the
elective share, the state may ultimately be forced to bear the costs of
her support. 2
7
122 This theory, one of the two theories underlying revision of the elective share provisions,
reflects a view of marriage as an economic partnership and is tied to the length of the marriage.
See U.P.C. art. II, pt. 2 gen. cmt. (1991).
123 This theory, the second one supporting revision of the UPC elective share provisions,
reflects the view that a spouse has a duty to support the surviving spouse even after the first
spouse's death. See id.
... See U.P.C. § 2 -201(a) (1991).
121 Of course, community property gives a spouse more during marriage than the inchoate
property right associated with the right of election at death.
1 See generally 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, at §§ 10.14.2 & 10.14.3. But see the examples
of California and Idaho, which have enacted "quasi-community" property regimes to afford
some protection to a surviving spouse from a common law property state. CAL. PROB. CODE §
101 (Deering 1991); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-201 (1979).
127 For example, state welfare and medicaid eligibility typically turns on "permanent" resi-
dence or simply "residence." See, e.g., TENN. STAT. ANN. § 71-3-103 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1992)
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Indeed, in adopting a domicile rule, the drafters do not appear to
have given a great deal of consideration to alternatives. The power
over and interest in 'immovables by the situs state seems to have been
ignored completely. Yet, in light of the strength of this rule in Ameri-
can conflicts of law, 28 it deserves greater consideration, if not accept-
ance. Moreover, no consideration is given to a broader interests anal-
ysis favored in one form or -another by many conflicts scholars.12 9
That analysis would seem particularly pertinent here where jurisdic-
tions may differ on the protection to. be afforded a spouse and a co-
herent rationale that transcends wooden rules of affiliation is needed
to choose among state policies.
An interests analysis or other creative approach might also come to
grips with the choice of law issues raised by the inclusion of testa-
mentary substitutes in the elective share. There has been much con-
troversy, for example, as to the law governing an inter vivos trust,
even when established expressly for the purpose of defeating spousal
rights. 30 There is a serious question whether domiciliary policies re-
garding the elective share should override the law of another state in
which a trust was created, the trustee (who holds legal title) is domi-
ciled, and from where the assets are administered. The UPC fails to
take account of these controversial conflicts between sovereigns, just
as its simplistic distinction in protection of spouses of domiciliaries,
but not of nondomiciliaries, is wholly inadequate.,
V 'GOVERNING. LAW CLAUSES
UPC section 2-703 provides that "[t]he meaning and legal effect"
of a governing instrument is determined by the "local law" indicated
in the instrument.' 3' This provision strikes a welcome blow for testa-
mentary freedom. It permits the testator 'to specify the rules by
which his property is to be disposed of regardless of its location. Fur-
ther consideration reveals, however, that this laudable provision is se-
riously limited and flawed.
To begin with, the provision only applies to matters of "meaning
and legal effect." The comment that follows indicates, perhaps unin-
(aid to dependent children is available only if the child i s "residing within this state," that is,
"making his home in the state").
1 See Schoenblum, supra note 12, at 87-88.
,29 For an overview of this approach to conflicts analysis, see, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note
59, at 13-48.
"s See generally 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 10.11.
131 U.P.C. § 2-703 (1991).
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tentionally, that the provision is to apply to "interpreting" the will or
other governing instrument."' "Interpretation" of an, instrument
does not necessarily present a choice of law issue. For example, the
Second Restatement of Conflicts, section 240, comment c 33' and sec-
tion 264, comment c"' indicate that interpretation involves the
meaning of words by consideration of all facts and extrinsic evidence
under the forum's own rules of evidence. 3 5 It involves a search for
the testator's actual intent and, thus, does not implicate a conflict of
laws. To the extent interpretation is what section 2-703 is'concerned
with, the provision accomplishes little, if anything beyond creating
confusion.'3 6 More likely, the UPC, with its reference to "meaning"
intends matters of "construction." That is, if evidence does not reveal
testator's intent, the objective meaning assigned by the relevant law
is to be applied.
The provision also applies to the "legal effect" of governing instru-
ments."3 7 The meaning of "legal effect" is somewhat obscure. Under
the Second Restatement of Conflicts, section 240, comment b38 and
section 264, comment b, 3e legal effect relates to the consequences of
the use of certain words. 40 A classic example is the rule in Shelley's
case or the doctrine of worthier title. Far more significant, however,
are questions of substantive validity and effect.'14  These would in-
132 U.P.C. § 2-703 cmt. (1991); see also infra note 151.
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 240 cmt. c (1969).
See id. § 264 cmt. c.
13 See generally SCOLES & HAY, supra note 59, at 779-80; Richard W. Effland, Will Con-
struction Under the Uniform Probate Code, 63 OR. L. REV. 337, 337 n.2 (1984).
' But see N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §. 3-5.1(a)(6) (McKinney 1981), which essen-
tially equates interpretation with what the Second Restatement and most jurisdictions would
characterize as "construction" of an instrument.
,37 U.P.C. § 2-703 (1991). Professor Effland has indicated that a choice of law reference in a
will to matters of construction would result in the provision not applying to matters of legal
effect under the predecessor to § 2-703, former U.P.C. § 2-602. However, a general reference to
governing law would be effective. If correct, precise drafting would be essential to obtain the
full benefit of the UPC's choice of law provision. See Effland, supra note 135, at 344-45.
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 240 cmt. b (1969).
139 See id. § 264 cmt. b.
"' Note that some jurisdictions use the term "effect," rather than "legal effect" to refer to
"the legal consequences attributed under the law of a jurisdiction to a valid testamentary dis-
position." N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-5.1(a)(5) (McKinney 1981); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW, §§ 239, 263 (1969). Thus, matters such as mortmain
limitations, lapse provisions, elective share rights, and forced heirship rights would be encom-
passed by the term.
"' See supra note 140 for the distinction between "effect" and "legal effect." Cf. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 7-6 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (permitting the testator to designate the law
impacting on "the validity and effect" of a disposition; the term "effect," rather than "legal
effect," is used).
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clude topics such as the rule against perpetuities, rules against re-
straints on alienation and accumulations, elective share rights, forced
heirship rights, lapse, and pretermitted heirship. In the international
context, it would relate to such underlying questions as whether a
trust will be recognized at all as a legal entity.
Under traditional choice of law principles, a governing law clause
will be enforced as to substantive validity and effect issues as long as
the law chosen has a connection with the jurisdiction designated.
This would be especially true of trusts. 2 Section 2-703 does not per-
mit a designation of governing law in this context. It is, thus, quite
limited in the freedom of choice that it affords a testator or settlor
and may actually be read as narrowing the scope of the transferor's
freedom to choose'the governing law. It also exerts pressure to
recharacterize issues as involving "legal effect" or "meaning" (inter-
pretation), thereby bringing the matter within section 2-703. Thus, it
legitimizes the drawing of obscure distinctions in legal classification
that should not determine whether an individual can designate the
controlling law. The terminology of section 2-703 must be clarified, so
that it unambiguously applies to matters of validity and effect.
Section 2-703 is further restricted in that it does not permit a gov-
erning law clause to override family protection provisions, specifically
the elective share, exempt property, and family allowance. Section
2-703 leaves unaddressed the handling of other family protection pro-
visions on the international plane. Notably, many foreign jurisdic-
tions afford forced heirship rights to children."' 3 Yet, if American
states are not prepared to enforce these rights, they should not ex-
pect reciprocity, for example, in the case of the elective share.
Section 2-703 also prevents implementation of the governing law
clause where it would be violative of a public policy of the forum
state. This type of public policy exception to choice of law has been
,I See, for example, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW, §§ 269(b)(i) & 270(a)
(1969), relating respectively to testamentary and inter vivos trusts. The trust must have a "sub-
stantial relation" to the jurisdiction the law of which has been chosen. Whether such a connec-
tion'ought to be required has been considered in depth in the context of contracts. See, e.g.,
DAVID F. CAVERS, Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, in THE CHOICE
OF LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1933-1983, at 59, 72 (1985).
"3 Under a forced heirship law, children of the testator would be entitled to a share of her
estate much as in this country her husband would be entitled under the elective share provi-
sion. See generally 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 4, § 12.02, for a consideration of forced heirship.
In the domestic context, there is also some doubt as to the coverage of the provision. For
example, it has been suggested that pretermitted spouse and heir statutes do not override the
freedom to choose a governing law, since they are not specifically mentioned as are the other
family protection measures. See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 155
(R. Wellman ed., 2d ed. 1977); see also Effland, supra note 135, at 346.
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utterly and devastatingly rejected by modern conflicts of law scholar-
ship. "4 It makes little sense to recognize a public policy exception
within the United States, where the laws of the various states simply
do not deviate so significantly as to justify denying application of an-
other state's law. 1 5 The essence of choice of law is a recognition that
different states pursue different policies. By allowing the forum to
disregard the transferor's choice of governing law simply because the
foreign law is inconsistent with forum law is essentially to deny the
validity of any governing law clause. At a minimum, it means that
the enforceability of such clauses will be entirely unpredictable.
Thus, a far narrower exception is all that should be permitted, if
there is to be any public policy exception at all, at least, as between
states.
The reference in section 2-703 to the "local law of the state se-
lected by the transferor" is also troubling. 4 6 Traditionally, the choice
of a state's law in succession matters has included the whole law of
the state, including its own choice of law provisions.", 7 Indeed, no
limitation to "local law" is imposed when reference is made to the
domicile of the testator for elective share purposes under UPC sec-
tion 2-201. If a testator designates the law of state X and, with re-
gard to the particular matter, state X would look to the situs state Y,
then the state Y rule is imposed. By indicating an adoption of state
X law, the testator is in effect saying he wants the result that would
be reached in state X. UPC section 2-703 represents a major shift. It
reflects the very different assumption that when the testator indi-
cates that state X law should govern he means only its local, and not
whole law. Yet, this creates an entirely novel result that would not be
available under the law of state X itself." There needs to be com-
144 See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173,
183-84 (1933); Ernests G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE L.J. 736, 747 (1924); Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, "Public Policy" in the
Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 1016 (1956). See generally WEINTRAUB, supra note 29,
at 81-85.
"' See, e.g., Herbert F. Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REV. 26, 35
(1938). A further question raised concerns just what constitutes a violation of public policy. In a
comment reflecting the Uncertainty of the matter, Professor Effland stated: "Most courts would
probably hold that local perpetuities law expressed a basic public policy which cannot be
avoided." See Effland, supra note 135, at 346. Indeed an expansive reading of the public policy
exception may be justified in light of the fact that "[t]he purpose of section 2-602 [now § 2-703]
is not to facilitate avoidance of local law." Id. at 347.
"4 U.P.C. § 2-703 (1991).'
" See, e'g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, §§ 242 cmt. c, 263 cmt. b (1969).
"' See, e.g., LEFLAR, supra note 59, at 11-13; see also Ernest N. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited,
51 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1182 (1938). See generally Schoenblum, supra note 12, at 135 & n.219.
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ment on this issue and, perhaps, eventually, recognition of a pre-
sumption based on the particular language used in the instrument or
the absence of particular language from the instrument.
Of course, the reference to "local law" in UPC section 2-703 may
simply be an oversight. The "whole law of the state selected," that is,
including its choice of law rules, may be what was intended. However,
if this is the case, it must be clarified.
Further clarification is also called for with regard to the number of
choices of governing law that can be made. Section 2-703 is written as
though there can be only a single choice of law. 149 However, d6pe-
cage,15 which would permit the designation of different choices for
different issues or different assets, is well-established in American
choice of law and is an integral part of sophisticated multijurisdic-
tional planning. UPC section 2-703 does not address this practice,
which advances testamentary freedom, a fundamental UPC objective.
Having endorsed freedom of choice in principle, the UPC should
clearly and explicitly endorse an approach that does not limit choice
of governing law to one per instrument.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, -UPC section 2-703, as revised, is
ambitious in certain respects. First, its scope has been expanded so as
to apply to "all governing instruments, not just wills." ' The term
"governing instrument" is defined in UPC section 1-201(19) to en-
compass many nontestamentary instruments. Thus, the governing
law clauses covered are not limited to those appearing in wills. UPC
section 2-703 is also ambitious in another respect. It applies to domi-
ciliaries as well as nondomiciliaries. In sharp contrast, some state
statutes are written in a way that gives effect only to the choice of
that state's law by nondomiciliaries. In other words, they are typi-
cally applied in the context of ancillary administrations.151 UPC sec-
tion 2-703, thus, allows a domiciliary of the forum state to vary the
law governing various aspects of his disposition of local assets.
The provision refers to "the local law of the state selected by the transferor" and "that
law." U.P.C. § 2-703 (1991).
"' For a general discussion of d6pecage see WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM M. REYNOLDS,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 124-26 (1984); see also Schoenblum, supra note 12, at 118
n.143, 127-29.
"' Between 1990 and 1991, the language of UPC § 2-703 and the accompanying comment
were modified so that reference is now made to "governing instruments" instead of "donative
dispositions." The substance of the provision does not appear to have been changed. Compare
U.P.C. § 2-703 & cmt. (1990) with U.P.C. § 2-703 & cmt. (1991).
"I See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-5.1(h) (McKinney 1981) ("whenever a
testator, not domiciled in this state ... "); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 7-6 (Smith-Hurd
1978) ("[i]f a nonresident decedent ..
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VI. SITUATIONS IN WHICH THERE IS No GOVERNING LAW CLAUSE
The revision of article II conspicuously fails to consider any choice
of law issues involving substantive validity and effect, or construc-
tion, when there is no governing law clause. There is also no provision
relating to capacity to execute a will, create a trust, or enter into any
other sanctioned arrangement.
These are glaring omissions. More often than not there will be no
governing law clause. Even if there is one in a will or a trust, there is
not likely to be one in other "governing instruments.' ' 53 Thus, the
focus of section 2-703 is on an important, but secondary issue. The
predominant problem that needs addressing is choice of law when the
transferor has not specified a choice. Except in the context of the
elective share provisions, 15" article II fails to address the matter.
Moreover, as noted, even when the transferor has indicated a prefer-
ence via a governing law clause, the effect to be given that clause is
highly uncertain and potentially restrictive at the present time. 55
VII. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON SUCCESSION TO DECEDENTS'
ESTATES
The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the
Estates of Deceased Persons, ' 5  which was finally approved -on Au-
gust 1, 1989, is likely to be presented to the Senate for advice and
consent, just as eventually occurred with the Washington Convention
providing for an international will form. 57 Although the Hague Con-
vention has been endorsed by several bar groups, 58 it has elicited
strong criticism as well. 59 As limited as is the UPC's foray into the
area of multijurisdictional estates, the Hague Convention would con-
"' See U.P.C. § 1-201(19) (1991) for the scope of the term "governing instruments."
... See id. § 2-201; see also supra text accompanying notes 113-24 for a discussion of choice
of law in the elective share context.
' See supra text accompanying notes 131-49.
See Hague Conference, supra note 55, 28 I.L.M. 146.
... See supra text accompanying note 57.
'18 Among these have been the American Bar Association, the American College of Trust &
Estate Counsel, and the International Academy of Estate and Trust Law.
"' See generally Schoenblum, supra note 12. See also Robert C. Lawrence & Marlisa
Vinciguerra, Planning to Protect Against Forced Heirship, Sovereign Acts and Creditors, in
INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING, supra note 4, at 74-81; Peter M. North, Reform But Not
Resolution: General Course on Private International Law, 220 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 9, 281-82 (1990); James Pedowitz, Report to the Real Property Divi-
sion of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association
(Sept. 11, 1989); Letter from Henry S. Ziegler, Partner, Sherman & Sterling, to Jeffrey
Schoenblum, Chair, International Property, Estate and Trust Law Committee, Real Property
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flict dramatically with the philosophy reflected and positions that
have, in fact, been taken in article II.
To begin with, the very procedure for enactment of the Hague
Convention is open to question. Some effort has been made to have it
apply nationally, rather than on a state-by-state basis. This would
conflict directly with the very process inherent in a uniform laws ap-
proach. It would run counter to the stated policy in the prefatory
note to part 10 of article II relating to international wills. In that
note, the commentators reject the federalization of wills law by treaty
and state that:
One disadvantage of this approach is that it would place a po-
tentially important method for validating wills in federal stat-
utes where probate practitioners, long accustomed to finding
the statutes pertinent to their specialty in state compilations,
simply would not discover it. Another, of course, relates to
more generalized concerns that would attend any move by the
federal government into an area of law traditionally reserved
to the states.1 6 0
This concern regarding federalization ought to be especially promi-
nent in the case of the Hague Convention. Unlike the Washington
Convention, the Hague Convention is not merely prescribing an al-
ternative form of will. Rather, its provisions specify which jurisdic-
tion's law applies to substantive aspects of inheritance. Thus, the
Hague Convention will have the effect of determining what substan-
tive law will control the disposition of assets situated in the various
states of the United States or in any other signatory's territory.
Apart from the foregoing, the Hague Convention departs signifi-
cantly from the direction of article II in that it differentiates wills
from other dispositive instruments, which are left to traditional, fo-
rum choice of law rules.16' This differentiation is in sharp contrast to
the revision of UPC section 2-703, which gives effect to governing law
clauses in all "governing instruments" and not just those in wills. In-
deed, the Hague Convention fails entirely to take account of the
wealth transmission revolution and the integrated nature of estate
planning. 62
In other respects, the Hague Convention departs even more dra-
matically from UPC section 2-703. For example, if an American na-
Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association (Apr. 10, 1989) (on file with
the Albany Law Review).
100 See U.P.C. art. II, pt. 10 prefatory note (1991); see also supra text accompanying note 55.
Hague Conference, supra note 55, arts. 1(2)(c) & 1(2)(d), 28 I.L.M. at 150.
'' See, e.g., Schoenblum, supra note 12, at 96 & n.56.
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tional designates the law of a particular state as governing, that des-
ignation will only be valid if at some time he was an habitual resident
of that state.163 In the case of a foreign national designating the law
of an American state as governing, he would, generally, have to be a
habitual resident at the time of the designation.164 No such require-
ments are imposed by UPC section 2-703 or any other provision of
the UPC.
Under the Hague Convention, highly formalistic terminology would
have to be adhered to in order to assure the validity of a governing
law clause. For example, if a single law were designated to govern the
entire estate, it could only be the law of habitual residence or nation-
ality at the time of designation or death. 165 On the other hand, if the
designation of a law is made to govern the succession "to particular
assets in his estate," no such limitation in choice of law would be
applied.'66
More generally, the Hague Convention adopts a series of wooden
choice of law rules for resolving conflicts. These rules fail to take ac-
count of either the contemporary currents in choice of law theory or
the interest of predictability that is essential to estate planning. The
concept of domicile as the relevant connector, which is the case for
the elective share provisions of article II and also for article III of the
UPC, is entirely replaced by a complex of connectors largely unfamil-
iar to American lawyers, including habitual residence, nationality,
and the more closely connected jurisdiction. 16 7
Importantly, the choice of law rules of the Hague Convention do
not apply to matters of construction, capacity, administration, or
procedure. " These matters are reserved for traditional choice of law.
Thus, considerable pressure is likely to exist. to engage in rigid and
artificial characterization of issues so as to obtain one outcome or an-
other. depending on whether the Convention or local law controls.
Hague Convention, supra note 55, art. 19(5)(a), 28 I.L.M. at 152.
Hague Convention, supra note 55, art. 19(5)(b), 28 I.L.M. at 152; see also Explanatory
Report, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH SESSION OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, cl. 73, at 563 (1990) (hereinafter Explanatory Report]. With respect to
"mandatory rules," such as family protection provisions, a governing law clause will only be
given effect if it designates the law of habitual residence or nationality at the time of designa-
tion or death. See Hague Conference, supra note 55, arts. 5(a), 6, 28 I.L.M. at 150-51.
'a' Hague Conference, supra note 55, arts. 3, 5(1), 28 I.L.M. at 150.
106 Hague Convention, supra note 55, art. 6., 28 I.L.M. at 151.
167 See Hague Conference, supra note 55, arts. 3(1)-3(3), 28 I.L.M. at 150.
See Hague Conference, supra note 55, arts. 1(2), 7(2), 28 I.L.M. at.150, 151; see also
Explanatory Report, supra note 164, cl. 37, at 541 & cl. 24, at 535. See generally Schoenblum,
supra note 12, at 89-90 n.29 & 96-97 n.56.
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The Hague Convention also eliminates the scission in choice of law
between real property and personal property. Some commentators
would consider this a positive development. 6" However, recent devel-
opments in Europe17 0 and the position taken by virtually all states,
including UPC states,17  supports the view that the venerable situs
rule for real property has broad support. Even critics of an absolute
situs rule have recognized that the situs state often does have an in-
terest in the application of its law.17 2 Indeed, the Hague Convention
on the Law Applicable to Trusts, 3 which has also been signed by the
United States,' but not ratified, imposes a choice of law regime that
does take into account the situs of assets.'
The Hague Convention on Decedents Estates is especially flawed
in its attempt to draw a distinction between interstate and interna-
tional estate -matters in the case of a federal country such as the
United States. 7 5 In principle, the drawing of this distinction does
make sense. As has been noted, the systems of law and inheritance
policies of the states resemble each other considerably more than
they do those of many foreign countries.17  The problem with the
Hague Convention's approach is that it defines international estate
too broadly. A single asset with a foreign situs appears to bring an
See, e.g., Eugene F. Scoles, Comments on.Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Succession to the Estate of Deceased Persons, Memorandum to John Wallace, Director, Pro-
bate and Trust Division, Section.RPPT, ABA (Sept. 19, 1989).
170 For example, Germany revised the Introductory Law of its Civil Code, but retained article
28, which defers to the law of the situs of real property if the situs state applies local law. See
generally Heinrich Sch~nfelder Einfiihrungsgesetz zum Btirgerlichen Gesetzbuche (EGBGB),
Deutsche Gesetze (1991); Rainer Gildeggen & Jochen Langbeit, The New Conflict of Laws
Code Provisions of the Federal Republic of Germany, Introductory Comment and Translation,
17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229 (1986). A similar respect for the situs is shown in recent enact-
ments by the European Community. See, e.g., European Communities' Convention on Jurisdic-
tion and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1978 O.J. (L 304);
1988 O.J. (L 319) (extending Convention to non-EC European countries); see also European
Communities' Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 O.J. (L 266).
See generally Schoenblum, supra note 12, at 87 n.22, 102-04.
"' See, e.g., supra note 114 (citing cases).
'1 See, e.g., Schoenblum supra note 12, at 90 n.27 (citing authority).
• 173 23 I.L.M. 1389 (1984).
"' See, e.g., id. art. 12; see also Donald Trautman, Book Review, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1101,
1110-11 (1986). See generally Schoenblum, supra note 12, at 103 n.76.
176 Technically, article 1(1) of the Hague Convention applies to "succession to the estates of
deceased persons," without limitation. Hague Conference, supra note 55, art. 1(1), 28 I.L.M. at
150. However, article 21 provides that "[a] contracting state in which different systems of law
or sets of rules of law apply to succession shall not be bound to apply the rules of the Conven-
tion to conflicts solely between the laws of such different systems or sets of rules of law." Hague
Conference, supra note 55, art. 21, 28 I.L.M. at 152. This provision would apply to the United
States if it chose to have it apply.
170 See supra notes 32 & 145.
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otherwise domestic estate under the Hague Convention,"" thereby
radically transforming the choice of law rules that determine what
jurisdiction's law governs. In effect, much, if not all, state wills law
would be internationalized and be subject to the terms of the Hague
Convention.
One other disturbing aspect of the Hague Convention is its com-
mitment to the enforcement of certain countries' inheritance regimes,
even those elements that may be pernicious by American standards.
For example, the explanatory report indicates that article 15 permits
a signatory country to ignore the otherwise applicable choice of law
rules and enforce a system of primogeniture. 17' Thus, United States
nationals owning property abroad could be subject to a system of bla-
tant gender discrimination. By incorporating the Hague Convention,
as it has the Washington Convention, the UPC would be endorsing a
discriminatory structure of rules long since disavowed in policy and
law in this country.1 79
CONCLUSION
The revision of article II of the UPC fails to address adequately
multijurisdictional aspects of gratuitous wealth transfer. The increas-
ing mobility of individuals and the geographic diversity of their es-
tates will not permit the multijurisdictional dimension to be ad-
dressed in piecemeal fashion much longer. The parochialism of local
estate practice will be forced to take account of the multijurisdic-
tional aspects, if only because of the demands of clients and the lia-
bility exposure of attorneys who ignore these aspects.
The UPC ought to be presenting coherent, sensible approaches as
it has done with respect to so many other aspects of gratuitous
wealth transfer. The disjointed efforts made to date are entirely inad-
,77 Explanatory Report, supra note 164, cl. 131, at 603 interprets the word "solely" in Article
21, see supra note 175, as requiring that not a single asset have a foreign situs.
178 See, e.g., Explanatory Report, supra note 164, cl. 110, at 587, wherein the statement is
made that "the situs may legislate that with regard to family-owned farms at or under a given
size the farm is to devolve as one unit by way of the male line of proprietor."
17) Constitutional challenges to the Hague Convention could be expected. For example, sup-
pose property is situated in a country discriminating in favor of male inheritance. A parent dies
and the property passes to a son. A daughter brings a suit in equity in the United States seek-
ing one-half of all ownership and benefits obtained by the son from the property. The son's
defense is the Hague Convention. The son's argument could be repudiated on equal protection
or federalism grounds. Of course, the more likely result is that the court would refuse to be
bound by article 15 and would assert the public policy exception to the Convention. See Hague
Conference, supra note 55, art. 18, 28 I.L.M. at 152. The relationship of article 15 and article 18
is unclear.
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equate. UPC section 2-506 is inconsistent with and actually under-
cuts the minimal formal and evidentiary requirements set forth in
UPC sections 2-502 and 2-503. The international will is awash with
problems and fails to provide an adequate and reliable vehicle for
bypassing local formalities while assuring with a reasonable degree of
certainty that the international will does reflect the testator's intent.
The ambitious reach of the elective share provisions give no real con-
sideration to the problems raised by lack of enforcement power
across state lines and national frontiers. They also fail to extend ap-
plication to all those who ought to have claims based on the philoso-
phies now underlying these provisions. The governing law clause, sec-
tion 2-703, is well-intentioned in seeking to effectuate testamentary
freedom. Unfortunately, it is poorly drafted, quite ambiguous, and
actually rather circumscribed in terms of the situations when it can
be employed. In all other aspects of wealth transmission by will or
other instrument, article II is completely silent.
The purpose of this Article is to evaluate revised article II and not
to present a comprehensive blueprint for resolving multijurisdictional
issues. That blueprint ought to be the product of a careful and delib-
erate process by those charged with drafting the UPC. However, the
time has come for the process to commence. The topic should not be
left by default to patchwork, retrograde efforts like the Hague Con-
vention on Decedents' Estates, which in many respects runs counter
to basic themes embodied in the UPC.
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